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ABSTRACT: The implementation of public programs to support business R&D projects 
requires the establishment of a selection process. This selection process faces various 
difficulties, which include the measurement of the impact of the R&D projects as well as 
selection process optimization among projects with multiple, and sometimes incomparable, 
performance indicators. To this end, public agencies generally use the peer review method, 
which, while presenting some advantages, also demonstrates significant drawbacks. Private 
firms, on the other hand, tend toward more quantitative methods, such as Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), in their pursuit of R&D investment optimization. In this paper, the 
performance of a public agency peer review method of project selection is compared with an 
alternative DEA method.  
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RESUMEN: La implementación de un programa de subvenciones públicas a proyectos 
empresariales de I+D comporta establecer un sistema de selección de proyectos. Esta selección 
se enfrenta a problemas relevantes, como son la medición del posible rendimiento de los 
proyectos de I+D y la optimización del proceso de selección entre proyectos con múltiples y a 
veces incomparables medidas de resultados. Las agencias públicas utilizan mayoritariamente el 
método peer review que, aunque presenta ventajas, no está exento de críticas. En cambio, las 
empresas privadas con el objetivo de optimizar su inversión en I+D utilizan métodos más 
cuantitativos, como el Data Envelopment Análisis (DEA). En este trabajo se compara la 
actuación de los evaluadores de una agencia pública (peer review) con una metodología 
alternativa de selección de proyectos como es el DEA. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Support for R&D and the innovation process plays a central role in the public policies of 
developed countries and is based on arguments for which a wide consensus exists. Among the 
reasons for public intervention the most fundamental is market failure, which can cause R&D 
investment to be, without the public intervention, lower than the socially optimal (Arrow, 1962; 
Klette et al., 2000). Although the reasons for public support are well established in the literature 
as well as in practice, it is necessary to examine the degree of efficiency of this support. 
 
In recent years, public policy evaluation has acquired growing importance, with the primary 
objectives being determination of policy impact as well as examination of additional effect 
generation. Although results are not entirely conclusive, in the case of R&D subsidies, some 
studies (David et al., 2000; García-Quevedo, 2004) indicate the existence of an additionality 
effect. These are ex–post evaluations of selected and already publicly subsidized projects 
however, and as such, the degree of additionality and even its existence is closely related with 
the ex–ante evaluation as well as the selection process. This relationship has only rarely been 
studied. 
 
In general, public agencies across Europe and in the United States use the peer review method 
to select and assign subsidies to business R&D projects. Although this method presents certain 
advantages, it also has some drawbacks. Private firms, on the other hand, use more quantitative 
methods such as Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) or Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) to optimize their R&D investment and to select and rank their feasible projects (Linton 
et al., 2002). 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine two differing approaches to the evaluation and 
assignment of public subsidies to business R&D projects, peer review and DEA, and to analyze 
which methodology is preferable. This topic is not very well documented in the literature, 
primarily because of data availability. Nevertheless, the existence of a database containing 
information on both subsidized and unsubsidized R&D projects, with individual information for 
each project as well as evaluations made by external experts hired by the public agency allows 
us to examine if evaluators are choosing the most “efficient” projects. In other words, it allows 
us to evaluate the evaluators. 
 
Although there are differences between the project evaluation objectives of a public agency and 
a private firm, both entities seek to identify those projects which are superior in all relevant 
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 dimensions and, in turn, guarantee that the selected projects have a high potential to generate 
economic benefits. In order to evaluate both private and public project selection objectives, we 
propose a two-stage methodology. First, we compare grading obtained by each evaluator 
assigning a particular grade to a project (peer review) with grading obtained by means of the 
DEA technique. Second, using the Propensity Score Matching technique, we analyze which set 
of selected projects (graded with peer review or DEA) is able to reach the objectives set by the 
agency. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the different methods of selection of R&D 
projects are examined and their advantages and disadvantages are discussed. In section 3, the 
database is described and estimates of the DEA scores are obtained and compared with those 
obtained by the peer review method used by the public agency. Section 4 presents the second-
stage, which analyzes if there is a differential impact between the projects selected by the 
agency and those that would be selected using the DEA method. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Methods of R&D projects selection 
 
The design of a public program of subsidies to business R&D projects requires defining a 
selection and ranking system in order to decide which projects should be supported. The 
decision criteria of the agency should be part of the evaluation of a public program because, as 
the structural models on this subject show (David et al., 2000), such decision criteria in the 
selection of projects has as major impact on the results of the program as well as on the effect of 
the subsidies. 
 
In their calls for applications, public agencies define, with varying degrees of precision, the 
criteria for the selection of projects to be subsidized. In principle, these criteria should be 
oriented to the objective of correcting market failures so that subsidies to firms generate, in the 
presence of spillovers, the appropriate incentives for an efficient allocation of resources. 
Frequently, however, other objectives appear in the decisions of the agencies (Blanes and 
Busom, 2004). Such objectives can include, among others, support for specific technologies or 
sectors, development of projects with high diffusion capacity and profound economic impact, or 
giving priority to projects which generate behavioral additionality by stimulating, for example,  
cooperation among firms (OECD, 2006). 
 
The process of selection and ranking of projects for the allocation of subsidies faces substantial 
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 difficulties which stem both from the limited information available to the agency in general as 
well as from the existence of information asymmetries. This is particularly true in the case of 
R&D projects, which are characterized by a high degree of complexity and uncertainty. The 
selection process seeks to find the value of the project’s contribution to technological 
advancement, as well as its economic potential and the need for public funding (Feldman and 
Kelley, 2003). The most common method used in the United States, the European Union, and in 
the majority of national and regional agencies is the peer review system. The European Union, 
in its 7th R&D Framework Program, emphasizes that expert evaluation is at the core of both the 
selection system as well as the concession of financial support. Furthermore, the National 
Academy of Sciences in the United States also considers that the most effective way to evaluate 
R&D projects is by peer review.  
 
The peer review system presents substantial advantages in the evaluation and selection of 
projects, particularly in terms of independence, impartiality, and transparency. It also brings in 
expert knowledge in the evaluation of technological projects, expertise which can often be 
difficult for the agency to have internally. Peer review also presents significant limitations, 
however, and is not free of criticism.  
 
In the specific case of subsidies to business R&D, the main criticism has been conservative and 
institutional bias (Brezis, 2007). Conservative bias relates to the tendency to reject inventive 
projects which may suppose substantial innovations but far from existing technology and, 
therefore, difficult to evaluate. This tendency, which favors the approval of conventional 
projects, can have negative effects on the impact of subsidies at the productivity level. 
Similarly, institution bias means that firms of a certain size and which have R&D experience are 
favored in the concession of subsidies. Other limitations which appear in the peer review 
method are the difficulties which an agency may face in identifying appropriate experts, the 
subjectivity of those experts found, as well as possible conflict of interest, especially in areas of 
small territorial dimension (Rigby, 2002). In addition to the aforementioned limitations, the use 
of external experts can also represent substantial cost to the agency, in both time spent on the 
evaluation process as well as in remuneration of the experts. In the case of the European Union, 
which has a database of 50,000 experts for their R&D programs, around 5,000 annual 
evaluations are requested. This figure represents an estimated cost of nearly 2% of the total 
budget of each program in question. 
 
Private firms must also establish a ranking for their portfolio of R&D projects as well as value 
each project in accordance with its expected rate of return. The fact is, however, that 
measurement of the potential of the available project portfolio to optimize selection among a 
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 wide group of generally incomparable projects is problematic. Likewise, it is also difficult to 
measure a project’s expected rate of return. Although numerous methods have been considered, 
a definite solution has not been reached (Linton et al., 2002). One adequate option is to use 
quantitative measurements for each projected possibility, such as current net value or other 
financial methods. It is clear, however, that an approach such as this is insufficient because it 
does not capture the broad complexity of an R&D project. In consequence, alternative 
quantitative methods have been proposed. Among these, the DEA method is of special interest 
because it may be of particular use in the selection and classification of R&D projects, 
especially projects which are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty (Linton et al., 2002; 
Linton et al., 2007). 
 
The DEA method presents as its main advantage the ability to simultaneously analyze multiple 
inputs and outputs; it does not require the supposition of specific functional forms which relate 
inputs with outputs. It also allows the comparison of the analysis units either among themselves 
or with a subset. DEA also presents some limitations, however, in that it is an extreme point 
technique in which measurement errors can cause significant problems. It is also a non-
parametric technique and as a consequence, statistical tests can be difficult to implement. 
Furthermore, DEA gives relative efficiency measurements but not absolute efficiency 
measurements, and therefore results with a “theoretical maximum” cannot be compared. 
However, this characteristic of offering relative efficiency results is appropriate to the objectives 
of our analysis. The purpose of using the DEA is to choose, among all projects, those which 
achieve a maximum output with a specific input level. In this case, the results of the DEA 
should be interpreted as a way to rank projects and to compare among them. 
 
 
3. Peer-review vs. DEA.  Methodological proposal and case study 
 
To compare peer-review with the alternative DEA method of project selection, we make use of 
data from R&D public subsidies granted by the Agency for Innovation and Business 
Development (CIDEM) of Catalonia (Spain). Since 2004, this agency has called for subsidies to 
promote R&D projects. In this paper, we analyze the 2005 call for R&D subsidies for firms 
operating in the high technology sector. The available database includes detailed information on 
the characteristics of applicant firms, of the R&D projects presented, and of the scores that 
external experts gave to the projects, the so called peer review scores.  The scores given by 
experts are used by an agency committee in the selection and subsequent ranking of projects. 
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 The criteria that the Agency has established in the call for R&D subsidies for the evaluation of 
projects are presented in Table 1. The six criteria can be grouped into the three main objectives 
of Agency:  
 
• Development of technologically outstanding projects that have a potential to generate 
spillovers (“technological contribution”). 
• Economic impact of projects in terms of Gross Value Added and/or R&D investment 
(“economic potential”).  
• Impact on other sectors and firms (“behavioral effect”). 
 
Firms which want to obtain an R&D subsidy must first present an application with information 
(qualitative and quantitative) about the firm and the R&D project. Then, in accordance with 
each established criteria, external experts evaluate the projects and give a score which allows all 
presented projects to be ranked. Finally, a committee organized by the agency uses this 
information to determine which projects will receive subsidies and the percentage of the total 
cost of the selected projects to be subsidized. In the present study, the original dataset contains 
information for 216 projects, 52% of which obtained a subsidy. 
 
Table 1. Agency’s objectives and criteria for selecting R&D strategic projects. 
Objectives of the Agency  Specific criteria  
Technological contribution  • Technological relevance and technical viability of the 
project.  
• Increase in the capacity of the applicant's R&D. 
Economic potential  • Socioeconomic impact. 
• Contribution to the internationalization of the economy. 
• Consolidation of the firm in the market. 
Behavioral effect  • Cooperation with other agents and diffusion of results  
Source: own elaboration from the order TRI/163/2005 of April 13, DOGC 4369. 
 
With this selection method of R&D projects in mind, we present the DEA technique as an 
alternative, one which requires choosing criteria that can be quantified. As such, we have 
deleted from the original database all those projects without relevant data, and have come up 
with a final number of 148 projects. The available information comes from the applications of 
the projects and includes data not only for 2005 but also for 2004 as well as 2006. This 
information allows carrying out robustness exercises of the estimated DEA scores. 
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 Table 2. Agency’s objectives and output measures.  
Objectives of the Agency  Measures of Output  
Technological contribution  • Output 1: Estimate of new R&D projects as a result of the 
project (2005-2006). Expressed in €.  
Economic potential  • Output 2a: Estimate of the contribution of the project to firm’s 
exports (2005-2006). Expressed in %.  
• Output 2b: Estimate of industrial investments induced by 
project (2005-2006). Expressed in €.  
Behavioral effect  • Output 3: Estimate of subcontracted activity in R&D (2005-
2006). Expressed in %.  
Note: as a robustness exercise DEA scores have been carried out using output data for 2005 and 2006 
(separately) and for the sum and mean of both years. 
 
DEA methodology, which is presented in detail in Charnes et al. (1978) and in Coelli et al. 
(1998), requires defining inputs and outputs which are common to all projects. In the case of the 
selection of R&D projects, and following Linton et al. (2002, 2007), we consider the cost of the 
project as input. The definition of outputs should respond to the objectives of the agency. In the 
case of the private sector, Linton et al. (2002, 2007) use as output different estimates of the 
discounted cash flow estimated for the project. In the concession of public subsidies to promote 
R&D, the objectives of the agency are essentially to promote technological advancement, to 
foment economic growth, and to provoke behavioral changes in the firms by means of an 
increase in cooperation among firms, which favors knowledge diffusion. In accordance with 
these objectives and starting from the available statistical information, Table 2 presents the 
chosen outputs. In addition, Table 3 presents the main descriptive statistics of the 148 projects 
analyzed. 
 
Once inputs and outputs are defined, the procedure maximizes outputs for a given level of 
inputs assuming a variable returns to scale (VRS) production function. In our framework, the 
VRS hypothesis seems adequate since all projects are compared to each other while still 
retaining different dimensions in inputs and outputs. 
 
Table 3. Input/Output descriptive statistics 
 Mean  Std. dev. Min.  Max. 
Input  848,555.5 1,791,711.0 60,269.8 15,806,918 
Output 1  571,432.0 2,604,700.9 0.0 31,000,000.0 
Output 2a  27,3% 46,0% 0% 100% 
Output 2b  517,242.8 1,231,134.2 0.0 10,037,000.0 
Output 3  4,8% 12,6% 0,0% 45.0% 
Note: the descriptive statistics for the 148 projects correspond to output values for 2006. 
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 The DEA scores are indexes of relative efficiency (project scores) and should be interpreted 
merely as a form of ordering the projects. This procedure allows the selection of those projects 
which obtain a maximum output (objective of the agency) given a certain level of input (cost). 
Efficiency indexes range from 0 (inefficient) to 1 (efficient). However, this range of DEA scores 
does not permit a full ordering of projects, especially among those which the DEA considers to 
be efficient (with a score equal to 1). To solve this problem the super-efficiency option of DEA 
techniques allow the assignment of values higher than 1 to efficient projects, reducing the 
number of projects with the same score and allowing a more precise ranking of projects. 
Allowing for super-efficiency, DEA efficiency scores are distributed between 0 and 10. 
 
The efficiency scores allow a precise ranking of projects. The resulting ranking is compared 
with the one obtained for the peer-review. To compare the degree of similarity between both 
methods we consider the number of projects approved by the experts (93 of 148). If we look at 
the first 93 projects from the DEA ranking we find that the degree of similarity between both 
distributions of approved/refused projects is around 14-16%. Therefore, the degree of similarity 
between the scores of the peer-review and the DEA is rather low, indicating that the two project 
selection methodologies give different results. 
 
To further compare both methodologies, we also perform an exercise which considers the 50 
best projects in both rankings (see Table 4). Nearly half of the projects considered as efficient 
under the peer-review methodology also obtained a high score using the DEA technique. In the 
case of projects refused by the experts, there is a 73% coincidence with the DEA results (72 of 
98), while 26 projects refused with peer-review were approved when given the score received 
with DEA. Summarizing, as a global measure of similarity between ranking methodologies we 
find that peer-review and DEA have a 65% coincidence in the final evaluation 
(approved/refused) of projects, with a 35% difference in the final evaluation of projects granted 
by either one or the other methodology. 
 
Table 4. Assignment of projects (approved/refused) according to methodology  
 Approved DEA  Refused DEA  Total  
Approved peer-review  24 26 50 
Refused peer-review 26 72 98 
Total  50 98 148 
Note: DEA results obtained with 1 input, 4 outputs (data for 2006), and assuming VRS. 
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 4. Evaluating peer review and DEA. A second stage in the project selection 
process 
 
The results of the previous section show a low correlation between the projects selected by each 
method of ex–ante evaluation. This seemingly contradictory conclusion calls for the comparison 
of the expected results of each set of projects in order to be able to determine if one is socially 
preferable to the other. If the objective of the agency is to generate the maximum possible 
impact, defined as the attainment of a higher social profitability derived from the co-financing 
of these projects, then it is necessary to compare the additionality that would be generated in 
each of the two scenarios. 
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Note: DEA results calculated for values of outputs in 2006. Robustness exercises show that DEA scores 
vary little if the sum of the 2005 and 2006 outputs or the average value of both data is used. More 
precisely, correlations between different scores are higher than 90%. 
Figure 1. DEA results 
 
Clearly, the ideal procedure to carry out an evaluation would be to observe the same unit (firm) 
in two different situations at the same time: to analyze its results both with treatment (subsidy) 
and without (non treatment or control). Since this is impossible, it is necessary to control for the 
counterfactual situation, that is, for what would happen in the case contrary to the one which the 
unit really faces. To do that, it is possible to use a non-parametric association method known as 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM). Starting with the work of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), 
PSM has been increasingly used in the evaluation of public policy. In the case of studies that 
perform R&D subsidies evaluation, this method has been used recurrently in recent years (Duch 
et al., 2006; Herrera and Heijs, 2007; Almus and Czarnitski, 2003, among others). The PSM is a 
method that allows estimation of the average effect of the treatment on units that receive it 
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 (denominated Average Effect of Treatment of the Treated or ATT), observing the performance 
variable exposed to treatment (“factual state”) (Y1) against the non treated (“counterfactual 
state”) (Y0).  
 
An estimate of the propensity score (PS) is not enough to compute the ATT, as the probability 
of observing two units with exactly the same PS tends to zero. A way of matching treated and 
control units is found in looking for the control unit with the most similar PS for each treated 
unit, a process called nearest neighbor matching (NNM). Although it is not strictly necessary, 
the method is usually applied with substitution, in the sense that a unit of the control group can 
be the best match for more than one treated unit. Once each treated unit is matched with a 
corresponding control unit, the difference between the performance of the treated units and that 
of the control units is obtained. The ATT is then obtained as the median of these differences.  
 
It is obvious; however, that some of these matches could be quite poor, as for some treated units 
the nearest neighbors can have a very different PS, despite contributing equally to the estimation 
of the ATT independently of their distances. With the kernel estimator, all units in the treatment 
group are matched with a weighted average of all units in the control group with weights that 
are inversely proportional to the distance of the PS of those treated and those in the control 
group. It is clear from the previous considerations that these two methods can derive different 
results, mainly in terms of the tradeoff between the quality and the quantity of the matching, 
with none of them being a priori superior to the other. Their simultaneous consideration, 
nevertheless, offers a way to analyze the robustness of the estimates. 
 
Despite the growing popularity of PSM, relatively little has been written on the problem of 
variable selection. Some studies based on simulations (Brookhart et al. 2006, Judkins et al. 
2007) show that selection of the variables which are included in the calculation of the PS can 
affect the bias, or the variance and the average quadratic error of an estimate of the ATT. These 
studies in turn suggest that variables not related to the treatment but related to the result should 
always be included in the calculation of the PS. On the other hand, the inclusion of variables 
related to treatment but not to results has been seen to increase the variance of the ATT without 
reducing the bias. For the calculation of the PS, variables referring to firms’ characteristics are 
used. These include sales, the number of workers, and the number of years the firm has been 
operating in the market. Several dummy variables are also included, which indicate if the firm 
operates in a high technology manufacturing sector, in a knowledge-intensive services sector 
and, finally, if it is located in the metropolitan area of Barcelona. 
 
The following tables show the results of ex–post evaluation under the two described scenarios; 
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 the selection of projects through the agency’s peer-review (ATT-A) and the selection of projects 
through the DEA method (ATT-D) using the described estimators. For this evaluation exercise, 
we use both the R&D intensity (R&D as a percentage of sales) to proxy financial additionality 
as well as the percentage of research subcontracted by firms to proxy behavioral additionality. 
 
Departing from the data used in the previous section, we add projects by firm and then filter 
some outliers. We end with data for 112 firms. From the information provided by the Agency, 
we have 67 firms that actually received a subsidy and the other 45 we have as a control group. 
Since we have computed the efficiency scores for these firms, we rank them in descending order 
and we assume that those with the highest efficiency scores would have received a subsidy had 
the agency used it as a selection mechanism. As in the previous case, those firms with low 
efficiency scores act as controls for treated firms under DEA. In so doing, we are thus able to 
compare the two sets of firms, those actually subsidized by the agency and those with 
potentially more efficient R&D projects selected through the DEA method. 
 
As indicated in Table 5, even if both methods select different projects to be subsidized, the 
results on the ATT show that both actually discriminate for the best projects. We can see from 
the table that in both cases, although with differences in terms of statistical significance, treated 
firms show a higher R&D intensity than firms in the control group. These results are robust 
since the conclusions that can be extracted are the same for the two estimators considered. The 
results shown in the table indicate that, on average, treated firms selected by the DEA method 
would have a slightly higher impact on financial additionality. 
 
Table 5. Impact on financial aditionality  
ATT-A  ATT-D   
Coeff. T C Coeff. T C 
6.41 9.18 
NNM  (1.69*) 
[1.75*] 
61 26 (2.25**) 
[2.05**] 
62 23 
5.45 10.17 
Kernel  (-.-) 
[1.73*] 
61 39 (-.-) 
[2.76***] 
62 38 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Bootstrapping standard errors in brackets. T is the number of treated 
firms; C is the number of control firms. *, * * and * * * indicate statistical significance at 90, 95 and 99 
percent, respectively. 
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 The picture changes somewhat when considering the impact on behavioral additionality. Table 
6 shows that only the treated firms selected with the DEA methodology have a significant 
statistical effect on the percentage of subcontracted research activities. Moreover, the estimated 
effect is substantial and demonstrates that treated firms would show an approximately 10% 
higher percentage of subcontracted research activities than non-treated firms. 
 
These results should be interpreted with care because of reduced sample size and the sensibility 
of PSM to the inclusion or omission of variables. Also, the impossibility of having pre-
treatment and post-treatment data conditions the estimated ATT effects. That being said, the 
results clearly indicate that a more rigorous ex–ante evaluation is needed, given that the 
differing impacts of the R&D projects selected by the two methods point to different 
conclusions. In the absence of such an uncompromising ex–ante evaluation, it is possible to 
conclude that R&D projects which do not conform to the objectives of the agency are in fact 
being subsidized. As such, the DEA method of project selection should be regarded as both a 
complement to the more traditional method of peer review evaluation as well as a demonstration 
of the importance of linking ex–ante with ex–post evaluation of R&D projects. 
 
Table 6. Impact on behavioral additionality 
ATT-A  ATT-D   
Coeff. T C Coeff. T C 
0.53 10.63 
NNM  (0.01) 
[0.08] 
61 27 (2.94***) 
[2.34**] 
62 26 
1.37 9.77 
Kernel  (-.-) 
[0.27] 
61 39 (-.-) 
[2.47**] 
62 38 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Bootstrapping standard errors in brackets. T is the number of treated 
firms; C is the number of control firms. *, * * and * * * indicate statistical significance at 90, 95 and 99 
percent, respectively. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Support for innovation is a key element in the public policy of the European Union, the United 
States, and the majority of national and regional governments. Although the reasons which 
justify public support for business R&D are widely accepted, it is necessary to demonstrate that 
these public programs are effective. This need has lead to the growing use of evaluation 
analyses, particularly ex-post evaluation, to help determine if public intervention generates an 
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 additional effect.  
 
Within such evaluation analyses, one subject that has been largely overlooked is the question of 
whether ex-ante evaluation systems for the selection and the ranking of projects and the 
concession of subsidies are appropriate. The impact of public programs is closely related to 
project selection processes, as the results and additional effects of programs rely on precision in 
the selection of projects which both fulfill agency objectives as well as generate substantial 
impact.  
 
This research has sought to analyze and assess the adequacy of the ex-ante evaluation 
mechanisms used in the assignation of public subsidies to business R&D. The method most 
frequently used by public agencies in their evaluation of projects is evaluation by experts, or the 
peer review method. Private firms, on the other hand, use different methods to value and rank 
their R&D projects, in accordance with the projects’ expected returns. These methods have a 
more quantitative character and, among them, the DEA has been seen to be particularly 
appropriate.  
 
In this paper, a methodology for the evaluation of the methods of selection for R&D projects 
and the concession of subsidies has been proposed. Accordingly, the applicability of this 
methodology has been demonstrated, using information drawn from the specific case of a 
regional agency business R&D project subsidy program. In short, the proposed methodology 
consists of comparing, in a first stage, the results of the peer review method with another 
possible method, specifically the DEA. In a second stage, a quasi-experimental technique of ex-
post evaluation, Propensity Score Matching, has been used to estimate the results and 
additionality generated by both project selection methods.  
 
The results of the research show that the selection and classification of projects by peer review 
and DEA share a low correlation. In addition, a comparison of the results of the analyses of the 
simulation of the impact derived from projects selected by both methods shows the difficulty in 
reaching definitive conclusions about the superiority of peer review over another method. 
 
Although the peer review method can be preferable in the qualitative evaluation of projects as 
well as in the resolution of the problem of asymmetric information, results show both the 
convenience of supplementing it with other methods as well as the necessity to advance in the 
knowledge of ex-ante evaluation methods. The ideas proposed in this paper seek to improve 
available information as well as consider project ranking and selection an integral process which 
closely links ex–ante and ex–post evaluation.  
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 Following similar studies (David et al., 2000; García-Quevedo, 2004), the results of this 
research point to the necessity of improving the evaluation procedures for R&D subsidies. 
Similarly, and in accordance with other recent analyses (Jaffe, 2002; Brezis, 2007), the research 
also highlights the convenience of examining the various alternative methods disposed to public 
agencies in their evaluation and subsequent selection of R&D projects. 
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